Proposed new ratings for compliance- Is this a Brave New World?
A Two Part Series.
Part Two – Change Creates Opportunity.
In April of 2016, the FFIEC released proposed new guidelines
for rating compliance programs at financial institutions. Once these new guidelines are adopted, not only
will they represent a strong departure from the current system for rating, they
also present a strong opportunity for financial institutions to greatly impact their
own compliance destiny. Although these
new guidelines have been released with limited fanfare, the change in approach
to supervision of financial institutions has been discussed for some time and
is noteworthy.
The Proposed New Rating
System
The new rating system is designed to focus on the Compliance
Management System (“CMS”) that an institution has established to administrate
its compliance effort. This assessment
is supposed to be risk based which means that for each institution, the CMS
should be unique. The size, complexity
and risk profile of an institution should dictate the structure of the
CMS.
The compliance ratings will focus on three specific areas
1)
Board Oversight
2)
The Compliance Program
3)
Violations of Law and Consumer harm
The guidance notes that a part or all of the CMS can be
outsourced to third party providers with the caveat that the financial
institution cannot outsource the responsibility for compliance. In other words, the financial institution
will be held accountable for the failures of its third party provider. For each of these areas, there are specific
considerations that the examination team will consider. The guidance describes the factors that
should be considered by the examination team for each of the factors:
Board Oversight:
The areas that will be evaluated for Board Oversight are
listed below. A review of these factors
indicates that the examiners will be asked to focus on the compliance
environment. The overall level of
importance assigned to compliance will be considered as part of the consideration
of the management of the institution. This
is consistent with the growing focus placed by prudential regulators on the
management component of compliance.
•
Oversight of and commitment to the institution's
compliance risk management program;
•
effectiveness of the institution's change
management processes, including responding timely and satisfactorily to any
variety of change, internal or external, to the institution;
•
comprehension, identification, and management of
risks arising from the institution's products, services, or activities; and
•
any corrective action undertaken as consumer
compliance issues are identified.
Compliance
Management System
The factors listed for the compliance management system are
familiar and include the following:
1. Whether the institution's policies and
procedures are appropriate to the risk in the products, services, and
activities of the institution
2. The degree to which compliance training is
current and tailored to risk and staff responsibilities
3. The sufficiency of the monitoring and, if
applicable, audit to encompass compliance risks throughout the institution;
4. The responsiveness and effectiveness of the
consumer complaint resolution process.
These factors will allow the examination team the ability to
look at a system for compliance in context of the institutions. Since each institution is unique, the system
for compliance should be reviewed in light of the overall operation of an
individual financial institution.
Violations of Law
and Consumer Harm
The final area of consideration is where the “rubber meets
the road” for compliance programs. Ultimately,
the goal of compliance programs has to be to mitigate against the possibility
of compliance violations. As part of
evaluating compliance programs the examiners have to consider the following:
1.
The root cause, or causes, of any violations of
law identified during the examination
2.
The severity of any consumer harm resulting from
violations
3.
The duration of time over which the violations
occurred
4.
The pervasiveness of the violations.
The examiners will clearly be allowed to make distinctions
between technical violations that don’t cause a great deal of consumer harm
form severe and substantive violations.
For example, the failure to provide notice of property in a flood zone
when a loan is modified is not likely to cause great consumer harm. More often than not when this transaction
occurs, the borrower has already purchased flood insurance and the notice is a
technicality. This is the sort of
violation in the past lead to difficulties in providing a clear rating of a
compliance program.
Opportunities Provided
by These Changes
The new compliance rating represents significant changes in
the ability of banks to alter their compliance destiny. The emphasis on self- detection and
self-policing allows financial institutions to perform self-evaluation and diagnose
compliance issues internally.
In the new rating
system, there is a premium placed on the idea that an institution has
compliance and/or audit systems in place that are extensive enough to find
problems, determine the root of the problems and make recommendations for
change. An attitude that compliance is important must permeate the
organization starting from the top. To impress the regulators that an
organization is truly engaged in self-policing, there has to be evidence that
senior management has taken the issue seriously and has taken steps to address
whatever the concern might be. For example, suppose during a compliance
review, the compliance team discovers that commercial lenders are not
consistently given a proper ECOA notification. This finding is reported
to the Compliance Committee along with a recommendation for training for
commercial lending staff. The Compliance Committee accepts the
recommendation and tells the Compliance Officer to schedule Reg. B training for
commercial lenders. This may seem like a reasonable response, but it is
incomplete.
This does not
rise to the level of self- policing that is discussed in the CFPB memo; a
further step is necessary. What is the follow-up from senior
management? Will senior management follow up to make sure that the
classes have been attended by all commercial lending staff? Will there be
consequences for those who do not attend the classes? The answers to
these questions will greatly impact the determination of whether there is
self-policing that is effective. Ultimately, the goal should be to
show that the effort at self-policing for compliance is robust and taken
seriously at all levels of management. The more the regulators trust the
self-policing effort, the more the risk profile decreases and the less likely
enforcement action will be imposed.
Self-Reporting
At first blush
self-reporting seems a lot like punching oneself in the face, but this is not
the case at all! The over-arching idea from the CFPB guidance is
that the more the institution is willing to work with the regulatory agency, the
more likely that there will be consideration for reduced enforcement
action. Compliance failures will eventually be discovered
and the more they are self-discovered and reported, the more trust that the
regulators have in the management in general and the effectiveness of the
compliance program in particular. The key here is to report at the
right time. Once the extent of the violation and the cause of it have
been determined, the time to report is imminent. While it may seem that
the best time to report is when the issue is resolved, this will generally not
be the case. In point of fact, the regulators may want to be involved in
the correction process. In any event, you don’t want to wait until it
seems that discovery of the problem was imminent (e.g. the regulatory
examination will start next week!).
It is important
to remember here that the reporting should be complete and as early as possible
keeping in mind that you should know the extent and the root cause of the
problem. It is also advisable to have a strategy for remediation in place
at the time of reporting.
Remediation
What will the
institution do to correct the problem? Has there been research to
determine the extent of the problem and how many potential customers have been
affected? How did management make sure the
problem has been stopped and won’t be repeated? What practices, policies
and procedures have been changed as a result of the discovery of the
problem? These are all questions that the regulators will consider when
reviewing efforts at remediation. So for example, if it turns out that
loan staff has been improperly disclosing transfer taxes on the GFE, an example
of strong mediation would include:
- A determination if the problem was
systemic or with a particular staff member
- A “look back” on loan files that for
the past 12 months
- Reimbursement of any customers who
qualify
- Documentation of the steps that were
taken to verify the problem and the reimbursements
- Documentation of the changed policies
and procedures to ensure that there is a clear understanding of the
requirements of the regulation
- Disciplinary action (if appropriate
for affected employees)
- A plan for follow-up to ensure that
the problem is not re-occurring
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